The Forces Shaping 2026: Why This Cycle Is Different

The 2026 midterms are unfolding against economic, social, and political pressures that make the populist argument feel less like ideology and more like a description of daily life.

1. Tariffs, Inflation, and the Affordability Crisis

The Trump administration's tariff regime has produced the largest U.S. tax increase as a percentage of GDP since 1993, amounting to an average additional tax burden of $1,500 per household in 2026 [1]. The Yale Budget Lab found that new tariffs raised $194.8 billion in customs revenue above baseline through January 2026, with the effective tariff rate reaching 9.9% in December 2025 — the highest since 1947 [2]. Prices followed: imported core goods prices rose 1.3% during 2025, with 40-76% pass-through of tariff costs to consumers [2]. Motor vehicle prices have risen approximately 8.4% under the full tariff regime, adding roughly $4,000 to the price of an average new car [3].

The Supreme Court struck down IEEPA-based tariffs in February 2026 (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump), but the administration responded with new Section 122 tariffs at 10% on $1.2 trillion worth of imports [1]. And prices aren't even the worst of it: manufacturing lost 77,000 jobs from April to December 2025 — the opposite of the reshoring Trump promised [4]. Job growth in 2025 was the weakest outside a recession since 2003, with only 181,000 jobs added for the full year compared to nearly 1.5 million in 2024 [4]. J.P. Morgan has warned of recession risk, projecting that tariff-driven business sentiment decline will weigh directly on spending and hiring [5].

The macro picture is now converging on stagflation. The BEA's second estimate for Q4 2025 GDP (released March 13) revised growth sharply downward to 0.7% annualized, from an initial 1.4% advance estimate - partly reflecting the October-November government shutdown, which subtracted roughly one percentage point from the quarter [130]. The February CPI (released March 11) showed headline inflation at 2.4% annual and core at 2.5%, with food at home up 3.1% year-over-year - but this data was collected before the Iran war began and does not yet reflect the energy shock [131]. The PCE price index for Q4 came in at 2.9%, well above the Fed's 2% target [130]. Goldman Sachs raised its 12-month recession probability to 25% on March 12 (up from 20%), raised its year-end PCE inflation forecast to 2.9%, and pushed expected rate cuts to September and December; the bank estimated that tariffs alone have added more than 70 basis points to core inflation [132]. Deutsche Bank warned that each day the Strait of Hormuz remains closed increases the risk of a broader stagflationary shock [133]. The University of Michigan consumer sentiment index fell to 55.5 in March (preliminary, March 13) - the 2nd percentile in the survey's history - with personal finance expectations down 7.5% across all income groups, ages, and political affiliations; year-ahead inflation expectations stalled at 3.4% after six months of declines [134]. Interviews conducted after the Iran war began showed sharply lower sentiment than those completed before, erasing all pre-war gains.

The political dimension: 55% of Americans say Trump's policies have worsened economic conditions (CNN/SSRS, Tier 2, Jan 2026) [6]. Nearly 70% predicted 2026 would be a year of economic difficulty [4]. The convergence of 0.7% GDP growth, 2.8% PCE inflation, 4.4% unemployment, and consumer sentiment in the bottom 2% of its historical range is the specific combination that economists define as stagflation. Historically, stagflation environments produce the largest midterm swings against the incumbent party — and this one arrives with groceries, cars, insurance, and gas all visibly more expensive than they were a year ago.

2. Operation Metro Surge and the Immigration Enforcement Crisis

The Trump administration's immigration crackdown reached its most extreme expression in Minnesota, where Operation Metro Surge — described by DHS as its largest immigration enforcement operation ever — deployed over 2,000 ICE agents and 1,000 CBP officers to the Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area beginning in January 2026 [7][8]. The operation resulted in approximately 3,000 arrests and the fatal shootings of two U.S. citizens: Renée Good, a 37-year-old mother, on January 7, and Alex Pretti, a 37-year-old ICU nurse and VA hospital worker, on January 24 [8][9].

A federal judge found ICE had violated at least 96 court orders in Minnesota since January 1, 2026, and another judge noted the "overwhelming majority" of ICE cases involved people lawfully present in the United States [7]. The operation cost Minneapolis over $200 million in January alone: local businesses lost $81 million in revenue, workers lost $47 million in wages, and 76,200 people experienced food insecurity as a result [7]. Nationwide protests followed, with demonstrations in over 30 cities and a statewide general strike in Minnesota on January 23 [10]. Bruce Springsteen performed a solidarity concert at First Avenue in Minneapolis [10]. The Nation nominated Minneapolis for the Nobel Peace Prize [10].

The political dimension: An AP-NORC poll (nonpartisan, Tier 2 equivalent) found that the Republican advantage on immigration shrank as independents recoiled from the administration's tactics [8]. The ICE crisis has directly shaped several key 2026 races: in Minnesota, it fueled Peggy Flanagan's call to dismantle ICE and fired up progressive turnout; in Maine, DHS cited Governor Janet Mills' sanctuary policies when announcing "Operation Catch of the Day," tying federal immigration enforcement directly to the Senate race [11]. The enforcement operation is also a fiscal and economic story: $200 million in costs to a single metro area, $81 million in lost business revenue, $47 million in lost wages. Federal agents killing two U.S. citizens in the course of immigration enforcement is the kind of event that reshapes public opinion durably rather than temporarily.

3. AI and the New Automation Anxiety

AI is piling onto the economic insecurity that already fuels populist politics — and unlike tariffs, it's a threat with no clear expiration date. In 2025, nearly 55,000 U.S. job cuts were directly attributed to AI, out of 1.17 million total layoffs — the highest since the 2020 pandemic [12]. Major companies explicitly cited AI when eliminating roles: Amazon cut 14,000 corporate positions, Workday cut 8.5% of its workforce [12]. Goldman Sachs found that unemployment among 20-to-30-year-olds in tech-exposed occupations rose by nearly 3 percentage points since early 2025 [13]. The World Economic Forum projects 85-92 million jobs will be displaced globally by automation by the end of 2026 [14].

What makes AI a populist issue is where the money goes. AI threatens millions of middle-skill jobs, but the productivity gains flow overwhelmingly to capital owners and executives — widening the very wealth gap that defines the Second Gilded Age. Women are hit harder: 79% of employed women work in jobs at high automation risk, compared to 58% of men [15]. The "junior crisis" is already visible: entry-level positions are being eliminated while C-suite compensation continues to rise.

The political dimension: AI displacement hasn't yet become a dominant campaign issue, but it compounds the economic anxiety underneath everything else. The core question — who benefits from automation, and who bears the cost? — maps directly onto the wealth concentration data tracked in Section 7 below.

4. Healthcare Costs and the Medicaid Cliff

The "Big Beautiful Bill" signed in 2025 included an estimated $1 trillion in Medicaid cuts, and the Affordable Care Act's enhanced premium tax credits expired at the end of 2025, driving up costs for millions of Americans who buy their own insurance [4]. In 2026, 1.4 million fewer Americans selected marketplace health plans, and that number is expected to grow [4]. Americans with employer-sponsored insurance also face higher deductibles and cost-sharing under new administration regulations [4]. Trump's worst issue-specific disapproval ratings come on healthcare (52%) and the economy (51%) [16].

The political dimension: Healthcare was the defining issue of the 2018 blue wave, and the conditions in 2026 are arguably worse. Joni Ernst's comment that "we all are going to die" in reference to Medicare has already been used as a recruitment tool by Iowa Democrats. Candidates running on healthcare expansion have a concrete, personal argument in every district where hospitals are closing and premiums are rising — and it's an argument that reaches voters across partisan lines, since Medicaid recipients and ACA enrollees include a substantial share of Republican voters in red states.

5. Operation Epic Fury and the Iran War: A War of Choice With No Rally

[This accelerant is actively developing as of March 30, 2026. The full military and diplomatic timeline is maintained on a standalone page. This section focuses on the war's economic transmission, constitutional dimensions, and electoral impact.]

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran ("Operation Epic Fury"), assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggering Iranian retaliation across the Gulf. The conflict closed the Strait of Hormuz, expanded into combat in Lebanon and Iraq, and by Day 29 had killed 13 U.S. service members in action (plus 2 non-hostile), wounded more than 315, and killed over 1,900 in Iran (Red Crescent) with regional deaths exceeding 3,000 [94][95][96][120][150]. Lebanon's death toll reached 1,189 (including 124 children) as Israeli ground operations intensified. On March 28 - one month into the war - Yemen's Houthi rebels entered the conflict with ballistic missile strikes on southern Israel, threatening a second maritime chokepoint alongside the Hormuz closure. Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and drones, wounding 12-15 US troops and damaging refueling aircraft in the most significant direct attack on US forces since the war began. The USS Tripoli arrived carrying 3,500 Marines. Iran agreed to facilitate humanitarian aid through Hormuz (the first diplomatic opening) while simultaneously operating a yuan-based "toll booth" system for allied vessels. Secretary Rubio said the US expects to complete objectives "in the next couple weeks." Combat continues across all fronts.

This war did not produce the political dynamics that American wars have historically produced. It is the first major U.S. military action since at least World War II to begin with majority public opposition — and opposition has held. Opposition to the war's legal basis, fiscal cost, and human toll is analytically distinct from opposition to Israel's existence or security — a distinction this document maintains throughout.

The polling picture (no rally effect confirmed):

Source (Tier) Date Metric Result
CNN/SSRS (T2) Mar 1-2 Approve Iran strikes 41% approve / 59% disapprove
YouGov snap (T2) Feb 28 Approve strikes 34% approve / 44% disapprove
WaPo flash Mar 1 Continue operations? 47% stop / 25% continue / 28% unsure
NPR/PBS/Marist (T1) Mar 2-4 Approve Trump handling of Iran 36% approve / 54% disapprove
NPR/PBS/Marist (T1) Mar 2-4 Support military action 44% support / 56% oppose
Quinnipiac (T2) Mar 6-9 Approve Trump on Iran 38% approve / 57% disapprove
Quinnipiac (T2) Mar 6-9 Makes U.S. safer? ~30% say safer / ~50% say less safe
AP-NORC (T2-equiv.) Mar 19-23 Action excessive? 59% say gone too far; ~60% oppose ground troops

Independents disapprove of Trump's handling of Iran by 59% (Marist, T1) [97]. Among Republicans, roughly 70% back the strikes — historically low for a Republican president at war; Afghanistan drew 96% Republican approval, Iraq drew approximately 90% [98]. Trump promised voters on November 5, 2024: "You're not going to have a war with me." The administration's rationale for the strikes has shifted repeatedly — nuclear proliferation, missile development, preemptive defense of U.S. forces — with classified briefings failing to satisfy even pro-Israel Democrats [99]. Quinnipiac found that 74% of voters oppose sending ground troops to Iran, including a majority of Republicans [97]. Trump has not ruled out that option.

The economic transmission channels:

The Iran war hit an economy already stressed by tariff-driven inflation, and the two shocks are compounding.

The Strait of Hormuz closure removed approximately 20 million barrels per day of oil supply from global markets, roughly one-fifth of the world's total. Brent crude surged from under $70/barrel before the strikes to a peak near $120/barrel by March 3, before retreating to approximately $85-90/barrel by March 10 as Trump signaled a faster-than-expected end to operations. That pullback proved temporary. By March 13, Brent had climbed back to approximately $100/barrel; by March 18 it surged above $108/barrel after Israel struck the South Pars gas field; on March 20 it closed at $112.19/barrel - the war's closing high - after Iraq declared force majeure on all foreign-operated oilfields. On March 23, Brent crashed 11% to $99.94 after Trump claimed "productive" Iran talks and postponed power plant strikes - but by March 27 it was back above $107, and on March 28 Brent closed at $112.57 (+4.22%) with WTI briefly crossing $100 for the first time [150][151]. Critically, the CNBC/BCA Research analysis found that the Dubai physical delivery price - which tracks actual Middle East oil, not paper futures - is up 76% since pre-war, nearly double the 36% rise in Brent futures. BCA estimates the world has lost 4.5-5 million barrels per day of supply, and warns that figure "will double by mid-April, becoming the largest loss of crude supply" in market history. Goldman Sachs estimates a $14-18/bbl geopolitical risk premium baked into current prices. The IEA's March Oil Market Report described the disruption as the largest in the history of the global oil market, with Gulf production cut by at least 10 million barrels per day and the global demand forecast reduced by 210,000 barrels per day [123]. The International Energy Agency released 400 million barrels from strategic reserves (172 million from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve) to bridge the supply gap, and on March 20 urged governments to encourage working from home and reduce highway speeds to ease a potential global fuel crisis [124]. Goldman Sachs revised its 2026 oil forecast upward, warning that prices may stay above $100 through 2027; Citi raised its near-term Brent forecast to $120 with a bull-case scenario of $150; Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal that prices could climb above $180 if disruptions last through late April [150]. The U.S. average gasoline price reached $3.98 per gallon on March 28 (AAA) - up from $2.92 at the SOTU on February 27, an increase of approximately 36% in less than four weeks [100][125][146]. Gas is now up more than $1.05 in one month - a bigger gain than after Hurricane Katrina or Russia's invasion of Ukraine - and Michigan became the first large state to cross $4 per gallon on March 24. Georgia became the first state to suspend fuel taxes, signing a 60-day suspension of its 33-cent-per-gallon gas tax [156]. Egypt imposed a 9pm business curfew to curb energy bills that have "more than doubled" from the war; Ethiopia is experiencing overnight fuel queues; thousands of tonnes of Kenyan tea exports are stranded at Mombasa. Unlike tariff price increases, which filtered through the economy over months, energy price spikes are visible and immediate. The pattern since March 20 has been one of volatile whipsaws driven by Trump rhetoric rather than sustained de-escalation: each claim of progress produces a one-day oil crash followed by a rebound as combat continues and Iran denies the claims.

The transmission channels extend well beyond the pump:

  • Shipping and supply chains: Fuel accounts for 50-60% of maritime shipping operating costs. As prices rise, shipping slows and freight surcharges rise — passing costs to the goods that use those supply chains [101].
  • Agriculture: Natural gas is the primary feedstock for nitrogen fertilizer. Qatar, which supplies 20% of global LNG, declared force majeure on gas exports after Iranian drone strikes. Fertilizer price pressure will feed into food costs within weeks to months [100].
  • Inflation trajectory: EY-Parthenon economist Greg Daco estimated that the gas price spike alone could push March monthly inflation to as high as 1% — the highest single-month reading in four years, and enough to push annual inflation near 3% [102]. The Fed, already holding rates steady, faces what Mark Zandi (Moody's Analytics) called a "no-win situation": higher oil prices are a negative supply shock that simultaneously raises inflation and suppresses growth [102].
  • Stagflation risk: The combination of tariff-driven inflation, war-driven energy costs, a weakening labor market (-92,000 payrolls in February, unemployment at 4.4%), and Federal Reserve paralysis is the textbook stagflation setup. Q4 2025 GDP was revised to just 0.7% while PCE inflation sits at 2.9% - the classic stagnation-plus-inflation pattern [130]. Goldman Sachs raised its 12-month recession probability to 30% (from 25% on March 12) [132]. EY-Parthenon raised its recession odds to 40% (from a 15% baseline). Moody's AI-driven recession model - which has preceded every U.S. recession since 1945 when it crosses 50% - sat at 49% in February, before the war began; chief economist Mark Zandi said the next data run will likely push it above 50%. The OECD raised its 2026 U.S. inflation forecast to 4.2%, up sharply from 2.8% and well above the Fed's own 2.7% projection. Bank of America analysts warned that higher energy prices could become a bottleneck for AI capital expenditure - "a major headwind for 2026 growth" [103]. The Federal Reserve held rates at 3.50-3.75% at its March 18 meeting, as expected, and raised its 2026 inflation forecast to 2.7% PCE (from 2.4% in December) while projecting GDP growth of 2.4% and unemployment of 4.4%. The dot plot signaled one rate cut in 2026, down from two cuts priced before the war. Seven of nineteen FOMC participants now see no cuts at all this year. The committee added a new line to its statement: the implications of the war in the Middle East "are uncertain." Fed Chair Powell described the economic outlook as facing "unusually elevated" uncertainty. His term expires in May 2026, with Kevin Warsh the leading replacement candidate [147]. Futures markets now price a greater than 52% probability of a rate hike by year-end - a complete reversal from pre-war expectations of lower rates. The 10-year Treasury yield hit 4.48% on March 28, an eight-month high, with the 30-year briefly touching 5%.

The war powers dimension:

Trump launched the war without a congressional vote and sent a War Powers notification that described the mission as "advancing national interests" rather than responding to an imminent threat [99]. Both chambers voted on war powers resolutions; both failed — the Senate 47-53 (Paul the only R crossover, Fetterman voting with R), the House 212-219 (Massie and Davidson the only R crossovers) [104][105]. A Senate group led by Booker, Kaine, and Murphy is demanding public testimony from Hegseth and Rubio [106].

The constitutional dimension extends beyond procedure. Democrats are positioned as the party defending Congress's war-declaring authority — being antiwar while invoking the Constitution and the 1973 War Powers Act. The argument connects executive overreach, fiscal accountability ($200B supplemental request, $11.3B in the first six days), working-class sacrifice (the first six KIA were Army Reserve soldiers from Des Moines, Iowa), and the gap between who decides to go to war and who dies in it.

The populist electoral argument:

The Iran war does not map neatly onto the Second Gilded Age framework — it is not fundamentally an economic populist issue. But it intersects with that framework at several points:

1. The fiscal dimension. War spending adds to the national debt and diverts fiscal resources from domestic priorities. The Pentagon estimated operations cost approximately $11.3 billion in the first six days alone; more than 250 U.S. organizations signed a letter calling on Congress to halt war funding, arguing the money is being diverted from food benefits, healthcare, and domestic needs [126]. The Americans bearing the cost — at the pump, at the grocery store, in interest rates on their mortgages — had no say in the decision to incur it. That gap between who decides and who pays is central to the populist diagnosis regardless of party.

2. The geographic concentration of sacrifice. Five of the first six Americans killed in action in Operation Epic Fury were Army Reserve soldiers from the 103rd Sustainment Command based in Des Moines, Iowa [95]. As of March 14, thirteen U.S. service members have been killed in action total [120]. Iowa is a Tier 3 competitive Senate race with an open seat (Ernst retiring). The war's human costs are not evenly distributed.

3. The bipartisan anti-war coalition. This may be the most significant political development of the war for the purposes of this document. Tucker Carlson and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene have publicly criticized the war. Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) co-sponsored the war powers resolution with progressive Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) — the same bipartisan duo that forced release of the Epstein files [105]. Trump promised voters on November 5, 2024: "You're not going to have a war with me." The roughly 30% of Republicans who are skeptical of the strikes represent something more interesting than a Democratic opportunity — they represent a genuine cross-partisan alignment on executive overreach, fiscal responsibility, and the gap between who starts wars and who fights them. That alignment exists independently of the populist-progressive candidates this document tracks, but it draws from the same well of frustration with concentrated power making consequential decisions without democratic accountability.

4. The compound economic shock. The combination of tariff-driven inflation and war-driven energy costs arrives simultaneously. Gas is up ~27% since February 27, with oil markets signaling the price relief from mid-March de-escalation rhetoric was temporary. Groceries are rising (food at home up 3.1% YoY in Feb CPI [131]). The February jobs report showed the economy shedding 92,000 jobs. Q4 GDP revised to 0.7%. Consumer sentiment in the 2nd percentile [134]. The simultaneous arrival of all these stressors in the same spring is the specific economic scenario that historically produces the largest midterm swings.

What to watch: The Houthi entry and whether they resume Red Sea shipping attacks, which would close the Bab al-Mandeb strait alongside Hormuz; the Prince Sultan Air Base attack trajectory and whether US forces are pulled back from Saudi Arabia; whether the Trump power plant strike deadline (April 6) is extended again or executed; the Pentagon's deployment posture (USS Tripoli's 3,500 Marines, 82nd Airborne) and whether Kharg Island operations materialize; Iran's humanitarian corridor offer through Hormuz and whether it expands to commercial shipping; the physical oil market divergence from paper futures (Dubai up 76% vs Brent up 36%) as a leading indicator of supply crisis; whether the war moves the generic ballot, which has remained stable at D+5-6 despite approval erosion; March CPI (April 10) as the first data release to capture the war's full energy shock; whether Congress engages on war powers during the two-week recess; and whether the DHS shutdown, now heading into its third month without resolution and with both chambers in recess, produces a political backlash that registers in polling.

The bottom line: Operation Epic Fury is the first U.S. military action in at least eight decades to begin with majority opposition and sustain no rally effect through twenty-nine days of combat. Silver Bulletin net approval has fallen to -16.7 - a new second-term low, driven by near-universal Democratic disapproval and increasingly negative sentiment among independents and Republican subgroups (CNN's Harry Enten: men, whom Trump won by 13 points, are now net -7 in approval; men under 45 are 19 points underwater). The AP-NORC poll (Mar 19-23, 1,150 adults) found 59% say military action has been excessive, about 60% oppose ground troops (including roughly half of Republicans), and 45% are worried about affording gas - up from 30% shortly after Trump won reelection. Pew Research Center (Mar 16-22, 3,524 adults, MOE 1.8) found 61% disapprove of Trump's handling; Fox News recorded 59% disapproval - the highest in either Trump term. A Quincy Institute/American Conservative poll conducted by Ipsos (Mar 12-14, 804 Trump voters) found that 79% want Trump to declare victory and end the war quickly; young Trump voters (18-29) support the war by only +8 points, compared to +53 overall. Non-MAGA Republicans are split 48-40 on support (Navigator Research); MAGA identification has dropped 6 points in a year. Joe Kent, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, resigned over the war. The war is adding oil-price inflation to a tariff-inflated economy, contributing to a stagflation setup - 0.7% GDP growth, 2.7% projected PCE inflation (Fed's March 18 revision), 4.4% unemployment, consumer sentiment at the 2nd percentile historically - that is the single most dangerous macroeconomic environment for an incumbent party. The S&P 500 closed at a seven-month low of 6,369 on March 28; the Dow entered correction territory; all three major indices are below their 200-day moving averages. Futures markets now price a greater than 52% probability of a Fed rate hike by year-end - a complete reversal from pre-war expectations of multiple cuts. On March 22, Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum to destroy Iranian power plants if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened - then postponed strikes for five days, and on March 26 extended the pause by another ten days to April 6, citing an "Iranian Government request" while simultaneously telling reporters he doesn't "care about making a deal." The IAEA has warned that strikes near Bushehr nuclear power plant risk "a major radiological accident." Germany's Chancellor Merz called Trump's approach "not de-escalation... but a massive escalation with an uncertain outcome." The war's intersection with the populist thesis is specific: concentrated power (executive war-making without congressional authorization), concentrated cost (working-class communities bearing the economic and human burden), and institutional failure (Congress unable to reassert its constitutional authority). The full military and diplomatic timeline is maintained on the Iran war page.

[Expanded treatment - this accelerant is actively developing as of March 26, 2026.]

6. DOGE and the Federal Workforce: Structural Economic Damage in Competitive Districts

[Expanded treatment - this accelerant is actively developing as of March 18, 2026.]

The federal workforce contraction underway since January 2026 is not a discrete event like a war or a jobs report. It is a slow-moving structural squeeze — one that has been building for fourteen months and is still accelerating as candidates file for 2026.

The scale: Since October 2024, federal employment is down 327,000 workers — a 10.9% contraction and the fastest reduction in the modern era of employment tracking, confirmed by BLS data released March 6, 2026 [107]. The Office of Personnel Management's Federal Workforce Data platform (December 2025) recorded 2.07 million federal employees across 128 agencies — government-wide staffing at a decade low [107]. The Cato Institute, not a liberal source, called it "the largest peacetime workforce reduction on record" [108]. Challenger, Gray & Christmas tracked 279,445 announced federal job cuts in the first three months of 2025 alone — the third-highest quarterly total in their records since 1989, behind only the pandemic shutdowns of April and May 2020 [109].

The direct headcount understates the damage. Apollo Global Management's chief economist estimated that for every federal employee, there are approximately two contractors [110]. By mid-2025, economists at Fortune estimated total DOGE-affected jobs — federal employees, contractors, and downstream grant- and procurement-dependent positions at nonprofits and research institutions — approaching one million [111]. The Partnership for Public Service analyzed over 530 community impact stories from 2025 and found more than 45% involved damage to science-related sectors: agricultural research, public health, and land management [112].

The geographic argument: 80% of the federal workforce is based outside Washington [113]. The Partnership for Public Service called it "the most significant reduction in federal government capacity ever" [127]. The competitive-district footprint is specific and documented: Newsweek and Split Ticket estimated approximately 600,000 federal workers live in competitive congressional districts [127]. Virginia's 2nd (Kiggans, Lean R) has approximately 30,000 federal workers. Alaska At-Large (Begich, Likely R) has approximately 22,000, in a state where the federal government is described as one of three economic legs holding the state up [113]. Iowa has approximately 22,000 federal workers, including researchers at the National Centers for Animal Health whose layoffs threaten livestock disease and vaccine programs — a high-salience issue in a farm state with two competitive House races [114]. Georgia has approximately 106,500 federal workers, including CDC Atlanta employees hit with a preliminary 10% cut [114]. The DCCC's February 2026 expanded target list explicitly named Rep. Robert Wittman (VA-1) on the basis of DOGE's federal worker impact in his district [115].

The downstream multiplier compounds the geographic effect. In Kansas and Wisconsin, USAID's near-dismantling eliminated a buyer for $2 billion in U.S.-grown crops annually [114]. In Iowa City, a 24-year-old physical science technician at the U.S. Geological Survey lost her job on Valentine's Day 2025 [116]. In Boulder County, Colorado, federal lab cuts are threatening the high-tech contractor ecosystem that those labs anchored for decades [116]. These are not Beltway stories.

Virginia as proof of concept: The November 2025 Virginia governor's race is the most complete ballot test of the DOGE electoral argument available. Democrat Abigail Spanberger won 57.2% - 42.6% — a 15.36-point margin, the largest Democratic gubernatorial margin since 1961, in a state Trump lost by 5.78 points in 2024 [117]. She ran explicitly against the federal layoffs and tariffs as an attack on the Virginia economy, and the message cut across class lines. Critically: she narrowly won non-college-educated voters (50-49%), compared to Youngkin's 19-point margin with the same group in 2021 — a 19-point swing among the exact demographic that populist candidates are targeting in 2026 [117]. Virginia has approximately 320,000 federal workers and hundreds of thousands of federal contractors; exit polls showed six in ten independents disapproving of Trump's leadership [117].

One data point from the human toll: a former USDA investigative analyst, laid off in February 2025, spent eleven months struggling to find work, finally landed a private-sector job in February 2026 — and changed his party registration from Republican to independent [118]. He is one person. The Spanberger margin and the DCCC's expanded target list suggest the pattern is broader, but the individual data will become clearer after the Q1 FEC filings (April 15) and the first quality polls in DOGE-affected districts.

The structural argument: DOGE is not a generic "government cuts" story. Government spending rose 6% in 2025 despite the cuts [108]. The Cato Institute — a libertarian organization with no incentive to defend federal bureaucracy — found that DOGE "failed to cut spending" while engineering "the largest peacetime workforce reduction on record." In March 2026, that assessment received its starkest confirmation: in depositions filed as part of a federal lawsuit over mass grant cancellations at the National Endowment for the Humanities, DOGE employee Nate Cavanaugh was asked whether the cuts had reduced the federal deficit. "No, we didn't," he said [148]. A Politico analysis found DOGE had cut only $1.4 billion in actual spending — and even that money could not reduce the deficit because it would be returned to agencies legally obligated to spend it [148]. The depositions also revealed that DOGE staffers used ChatGPT prompts to identify grants for cancellation, with one employee unable to define the "DEI" criteria he was applying [148]. The costs of the cuts may exceed the savings: the Partnership for Public Service estimated the fire-rehire-paid-leave cycle cost taxpayers approximately $135 billion, and a Yale Budget Lab report projected that if 22,000 IRS employees left their roles, the agency would lose $8.5 billion in 2026 revenue from reduced audit capacity [149]. That combination raises a question that reaches beyond partisan framing: if the cuts didn't save money, what were they for? The documented record suggests they eliminated oversight capacity (IRS audit staff, EPA enforcement, USDA inspection), removed institutional checks on executive power, and concentrated decision-making authority in a smaller circle. Whether you call that a populist issue or a constitutional one, the pattern is the same: concentrated power making consequential decisions that fall hardest on working-class communities.

What to watch: Whether the IRS staffing collapse produces the projected $500 billion in revenue loss from reduced audit capacity, and whether that becomes a kitchen-table issue [119]; the DOGE charter expiration date of July 4, 2026, and whether a second-phase restructuring begins before the election; Virginia redistricting, where Spanberger's new Democratic trifecta is pursuing a constitutional amendment that could convert one to two Republican-held seats for 2026 [117].

8. The DHS Partial Shutdown: Government Dysfunction Made Visible

[This accelerant is actively developing as of March 30, 2026 (Day 44 of shutdown - now the longest government shutdown in U.S. history).]

The Department of Homeland Security has been unfunded since February 14, 2026, after congressional negotiations over immigration enforcement reform collapsed following the fatal shooting of Alex Pretti by CBP agents [154]. The shutdown is the second DHS funding lapse in six months. On March 29, it surpassed the 43-day October-November 2025 shutdown to become the longest government shutdown in American history.

The scale: As of Day 44, more than 510 TSA agents have quit. TSA acting administrator Ha Nguyen McNeill told the House Homeland Security Committee on March 25 that the agency is experiencing "the highest wait times in TSA history," with waits exceeding 4.5 hours at some airports. TSA employees have worked 87 unpaid days in FY2026; nearly $1 billion in payroll has gone unpaid. Callout rates exceed 40-50% at some airports, with a nationwide average around 11%. McNeill warned the agency "may have to close smaller airports if we do not have enough officers." Spring break travelers face hours-long security lines at Houston, Atlanta, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and San Diego; the agency screens approximately three million passengers on peak days with a shrinking workforce. Delta Airlines suspended special flight services for members of Congress. The AFGE union president told lawmakers: "Do not get on a plane" for Easter recess. On March 27, Trump signed an executive order directing DHS to pay TSA officers, with paychecks expected as early as March 30 - a move that buys political time but does not resolve the underlying funding impasse.

ICE to airports: On March 22, Trump announced that Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents would deploy to airports Monday, with border czar Tom Homan confirming the plan on CNN. Homan said ICE agents would relieve TSA officers of "non-significant roles" like guard duty at terminal entries and exits — "I don't see an ICE agent looking at an X-ray machine" — but Transportation Secretary Duffy described a broader role, and the administration separately stated agents would arrest undocumented immigrants at airports. Senate Minority Leader Schumer called the deployment "disturbing." Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson said ICE agents are not welcome at the city's airports. Separately, Elon Musk offered to pay TSA salaries out of pocket, though legal experts noted potential violations of the Antideficiency Act (the same issue raised when Timothy Mellon covered military pay during the fall 2025 shutdown) [160]. World Central Kitchen — more accustomed to feeding people in war zones — began providing meals to TSA officers at Washington-area airports.

The political failure: Congress left Washington for a two-week recess on March 28 with competing DHS bills and no path to resolution. In the early hours of March 27, the Senate passed a bipartisan bill funding all of DHS except ICE and parts of CBP through a voice vote. House Speaker Johnson called it "a joke" and instead pushed through a 60-day full-DHS continuing resolution (213-203) that the Senate had already rejected. Neither bill has a viable path in the other chamber. Trump's TSA pay executive order redirects existing funds with "a reasonable and logical nexus to TSA operations" to pay the roughly 61,000 essential TSA employees who have continued working without pay - but other DHS staff at CISA, FEMA, and the Coast Guard remain unfunded. The pay order also reduces the political urgency on Congress to resolve the impasse before returning from recess in mid-April.

The political dimension: The DHS shutdown operates as a separate but compounding accelerant alongside the DOGE workforce story and the Iran war. The federal government is simultaneously firing workers it employs (DOGE), not paying workers it requires to show up (DHS), requesting $200 billion for a war most Americans oppose (Iran), and deploying immigration enforcement agents to perform airport security roles they are not trained for. The combined effect reinforces the institutional failure narrative that populist candidates in both parties are running against. The spring break timing raises salience: millions of Americans are experiencing multi-hour airport security lines as a direct, personal encounter with government dysfunction. The economic estimates are significant: the House Appropriations Committee cited $2.5 billion in total economic losses from the shutdown. CBS News travelers at Houston's airport described the experience - no food, water, or air conditioning in basement corridors where lines stretched - as a visible embodiment of government failure that cuts across partisan lines.

What to watch: Whether Congress reaches a deal before recess; whether ICE agents at airports produce incidents that escalate the political stakes; whether TSA staffing losses reach a threshold that forces airport closures; the interaction with immigration enforcement politics in the Minnesota and Maine races; whether the shutdown's visibility in spring break travel coverage translates to polling movement on government competence questions.

7. Wealth Concentration: The Second Gilded Age by the Numbers

[Expanded treatment - this accelerant is actively developing as of March 2026.]

Tariffs, ICE raids, AI layoffs, and healthcare cuts are all downstream of one structural condition: the United States has the most concentrated wealth distribution since the Federal Reserve began tracking household wealth in 1989 — and by historical estimates, since the original Gilded Age itself.

Where we are. As of Q3 2025, the top 1% of U.S. households held 31.7% of all national wealth — the highest share on record in the Fed's data series — with combined assets of approximately $55 trillion, roughly equal to the wealth held by the bottom 90% [135]. The bottom 50% of households hold 2.5% of national wealth, down from 3.4% in 1989 — a 26% decline in their share over 35 years [136]. The top 10% hold 67.2% of all household wealth; the bottom 50% hold an average of $60,000 each [137].

The billionaire count tells a related story. In 1989, there were 66 U.S. billionaires. By late 2025, there were 905, with a combined net worth of $7.8 trillion — nearly double what the bottom 50% of American households hold in total [136]. Since 1989, the richest 1% saw their combined household wealth grow from roughly $11.7 trillion to $50 trillion in real terms — more than quadrupling [136].

How we got here. The postwar decades produced the most equitable wealth distribution in modern American history: the top 1%'s share fell from roughly 30% in the late 1920s to approximately 20% by the mid-1970s, as union density peaked, the minimum wage rose in real terms, and top marginal tax rates remained above 70% [138]. Since 1978, the trajectory has reversed. CEO realized compensation is now 1,094% higher than in 1978; typical worker compensation is up 26% over the same period [139]. The CEO-to-worker pay ratio was 21:1 in 1965 and 31:1 in 1978. By 2000 it had reached 380:1. It stands at 281:1 in 2024 — still nearly 14 times the 1965 level [139]. The bottom 50% of Americans own virtually no corporate stock, so the equity-driven wealth gains of the past 15 years have flowed almost entirely to households in the upper quintile [135].

How it compares to the original. Precise comparisons are complicated by the absence of income tax data before 1913, but economic historians' best estimates using Census property records and estate data suggest the First Gilded Age peak (~1890-1900) was more extreme than today: the top 10% likely controlled 70-90% of all national wealth, and the richest 4,000 families had roughly as much wealth as the other 11.6 million families combined [140][141]. The intervening century — two world wars, the New Deal, progressive taxation, union expansion — produced a compression that lasted from roughly 1935 to 1980. The current era represents a reversal of that compression, not yet at the 1900 peak, but closing the gap.

Metric First Gilded Age peak (~1900) Postwar low (~1975) Today (2025)
Top 1% wealth share ~27-30% (est.) ~20% 31.7% [135]
Top 10% wealth share ~70-90% (est.) ~35% 67.2% [137]
U.S. billionaires (count) n/a n/a 905 [136]
CEO-to-worker pay ratio n/a ~25:1 281:1 [139]
Billionaire election spending Untracked ~$0 $2.6B (2024) [142]

Historical estimates for the First Gilded Age are derived from Census property records and estate data; they are less precise than modern Fed survey data.

Money in politics. The wealth concentration does not stay in the economy. It enters the political system. Just 100 billionaire families contributed $2.6 billion to federal elections in 2024 — one of every six dollars spent across all candidates, parties, and committees, and 2.5 times what individual billionaire donors spent in 2020 [142]. Billionaire political spending has increased 160-fold since the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision in 2010 [142]. In 2024, 300 billionaires and their families poured $3 billion into the election — representing 0.009% of all donors but approximately 19% of all spending [143]. One donor contributed $294 million — roughly equivalent to the combined donations of 3 million small-dollar donors [144]. At least 44 of the 902 U.S. billionaires on the 2025 Forbes list were either elected or appointed to state or federal office in the past decade, or are married to someone who was [145]. The problem documented here is structural — it applies to any concentration of wealth sufficient to distort democratic outcomes, regardless of the identities of the individuals who happen to hold it.

Competing diagnoses, shared data. The concentration of wealth in politics is a documented condition with competing proposed solutions. This document tracks candidates advocating government-led structural reform — antitrust, tax policy, labor law, healthcare expansion. A competing tradition, rooted in libertarian and free-market economics, argues that reducing government power would eliminate the rent-seeking incentives that drive political spending in the first place — that billionaires buy influence because the government has so much power to sell. Both diagnoses start from the same data. This document follows the structural-reform path because that is where the 2026 candidates are running, not because the alternative diagnosis is without merit.

The political dimension. The candidates tracked in this document are running against a measurable, documented condition — not a rhetorical abstraction. The data above is drawn from Federal Reserve surveys, EPI analysis, Census records, and Forbes tallies. The original Gilded Age ended because the concentration of wealth became politically untenable — and produced, over two decades, the Progressive Era reforms that restructured American capitalism. Whether 2026 sits on a similar hinge is the central question of this document.

The New Populist-Progressive Framework

A crop of younger, outsider candidates is challenging both Republican incumbents and the Democratic Party establishment with overlapping but distinct political identities. The differences between them matter — because the kind of majority that emerges, if any, depends on which faction supplies the winners.

The Candidate Taxonomy

Category Core Characteristics Historical Analog
ECONOMIC POPULIST Leads with anti-oligarchy framing; names concentrated wealth as the central problem; working-class identity and appeal; often skeptical of party establishment; may break from Democratic orthodoxy on guns, immigration, or cultural issues William Jennings Bryan, early FDR, Robert La Follette. Huey Long demonstrated the electoral power of working-class economic populism but also the danger of that frame sliding into authoritarian demagoguery — a failure mode this document's candidates explicitly reject.
PROGRESSIVE Shares populist policy goals (healthcare, labor, climate) but frames them through identity, justice, or institutional reform; more comfortable within progressive movement infrastructure; leads with moral argument Robert La Follette, the Progressive caucus tradition, Elizabeth Warren
CENTER-LEFT / ESTABLISHMENT Pragmatic coalition-builder; corporate-donor-friendly; emphasizes electability and bipartisan appeal; incrementalist on economic reform; institutionally loyal to party leadership The DLC tradition, Clinton-era Democrats
MODERATE / CROSSOVER Emphasizes bipartisanship; positions calibrated to district/state lean; avoids ideological framing; runs on competence and personal brand Blue Dog Democrats, Joe Manchin tradition
INDEPENDENT POPULIST Runs outside the Democratic Party entirely on populist economic themes; rejects both party establishments Historical parallels: Bull Moose Progressives, Farmer-Labor Party
INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRAT / THIRD WAY Aligned with party institutional apparatus and donor networks; skeptical of anti-corporate framing; prioritizes party unity and incremental reform over ideological differentiation; often backed by DSCC, AIPAC, Fairshake, or industry PACs; theory of change runs through existing party structures rather than against them. Not a pejorative — a descriptive label for candidates whose strategic model depends on institutional support. The DLC tradition; Al From; Clinton-era "New Democrats"; the current Schumer-aligned Senate committee apparatus

Core Populist-Progressive Policy Markers

These are the policy positions that bind the populist-progressive candidates together, though individual candidates emphasize different elements:

  • Anti-oligarchy economic framing — explicitly identifying concentrated corporate and billionaire power as the central obstacle to working-class prosperity
  • Universal or dramatically expanded healthcare — Medicare expansion, public option, or single-payer
  • Pro-labor agenda — union rights, PRO Act, worker organizing protections
  • Corporate accountability — antitrust enforcement, ending corporate PAC influence, tax reform targeting wealth concentration
  • Climate action through jobs — green energy framed as industrial and employment policy, not austerity
  • Housing as a right — aggressive action on housing affordability and speculation
  • Rejection of or skepticism toward corporate PAC money — small-dollar fundraising model
  • Working-class cultural fluency — ability to connect with non-college voters through shared economic experience rather than ideological purity tests

How This Document Works as of Mar 20

Static sections (update rarely — only when fundamentals change):
- The Central Question, Candidate Taxonomy, Core Policy Markers, Historical Parallels, Structural Barriers

Dynamic sections (update as developments warrant):
- Dashboard, Changelog, Primary Calendar, Polling Tables, Race Ratings, Scenario Probabilities, Special Election Tracker, Money/Fundraising Data

What "Economic Populism" Means Here

Economic populism as this document uses the term refers to structural and policy critique: wealth concentration measured by asset distribution, labor's declining share of productivity gains, campaign finance as a transmission mechanism between economic power and legislative outcomes, and candidates whose platforms address those specific dynamics through legislation - antitrust enforcement, labor law reform, tax policy, healthcare access.

It does not track, endorse, or provide analytical cover for movements that locate the source of economic harm in ethnic, religious, or national-origin groups - even when those movements use populist vocabulary. The distinction is not subtle: structural critique identifies systems and policies as the problem and proposes legislative remedies. Scapegoating identifies people as the problem. These are different diagnoses with different proposed solutions, and the electoral data this document tracks does not treat them as related phenomena.

Candidates appear in this document because of where they fall on measurable policy and electoral dimensions, not because of ideological affiliation. The taxonomy categories - Economic Populist, Progressive, Institutional Democrat - are descriptive electoral classifications, not endorsements.

How We Handle Polling and Sources

Polling is the backbone of this document's race-by-race analysis, but not all polls are created equal. The last decade has shown that which polls you trust, and how you weight them, matters as much as the topline numbers. This section lays out the hierarchy we use to sort reliable data from noise.

The Pollster Tier System

This document sorts pollsters into three tiers based on the Silver Bulletin's January 2026 ratings update, which grades firms on historical accuracy, methodological transparency, and whether they participate in the AAPOR Transparency Initiative or share data with the Roper Center [61].

Tier 1 (A or A+ rated, high weight): Washington Post/Schar School, Marquette University Law School, NYT/Siena, Monmouth University, Marist College, Emerson College, SurveyUSA, UNH Survey Center. These are the polls this document treats as signal. When a Tier 1 poll drops on a race, it anchors the analysis. When a Tier 1 poll and a Tier 3 poll disagree, we go with Tier 1 [61][62].

Tier 2 (B+ to A- rated, moderate weight): Fox News/Beacon Research, CNN/SSRS, Morning Consult, YouGov, Quinnipiac, PPP (Public Policy Polling), DDHQ/Decision Desk HQ. These polls are useful for trend lines and confirmation. They sometimes carry methodological trade-offs (online panels, smaller samples in state races) but have solid track records. We cite them freely but don't let a single Tier 2 poll override Tier 1 consensus.

Tier 3 (B or below, low weight / flagged): Rasmussen Reports, Trafalgar Group, InsiderAdvantage, Patriot Polling, McLaughlin & Associates, Quantus Insights. These firms have documented patterns of partisan lean, herding, or low transparency. This document does not exclude them entirely, but it flags them when cited and never uses them as the sole basis for a rating or probability estimate [63].

The Midterm Accuracy Question: Why 2026 Polling Starts on Solid Ground

Recent polling history presents a clear split between presidential and midterm cycles. In presidential years with Trump on the ballot, polls underestimated Republican support by an average of 2-3 points in 2016, 4.7 points in 2020, and roughly 2.9 points in 2024 [64][65]. But in midterm cycles, the picture is different. FiveThirtyEight found 2022 polling was the most accurate since at least 1998, with a weighted-average bias of just D+0.8 [66]. In 2018, polls carried a slight Republican bias of R+0.5 [66].

The leading explanation is partisan nonresponse: Trump draws low-propensity voters who don't take polls and don't show up for midterms. When he's on the ballot, polls miss them. When he's not, the electorate that shows up more closely matches the electorate that takes surveys [64][67]. Pollster Natalie Jackson of GQR Insights put it directly: when Trump is on the ballot, polls underestimate him; in midterms, polls do a pretty decent job of predicting congressional results [67].

This doesn't mean 2026 polling will be perfect. The bearish case is that pollsters who overcorrected for the Trump undercount in 2024 might now carry a slight Republican bias into a midterm where that correction isn't needed. The Silver Bulletin flagged this risk in January 2026, noting that the 2025 off-year elections showed a modest Republican bias [67]. But the base case for midterm polling accuracy is reasonably strong, and this document treats it accordingly.

The Partisan Flooding Problem

In 2022 and again in 2024, Republican-aligned polling firms released large volumes of polls in competitive states, sometimes dozens in the final weeks of a campaign. Democratic strategist Simon Rosenberg documented over 60 GOP-aligned polls dropped into averages in the closing stretch of the 2024 cycle [68]. Some firms, like Quantus Insights, publicly took credit for shifting state-level averages toward Trump [68].

The good news: serious aggregators already account for this. Silver Bulletin, Split Ticket, and DDHQ all weight polls by quality and adjust for known partisan lean, limiting the influence of any single low-rated firm [63][69]. Split Ticket demonstrated in October 2024 that removing all partisan polls from their averages changed the topline by less than a point in every competitive state [63]. The effect is more about perception and media narrative than about actual analytical distortion, at least for anyone reading past the headlines.

This document handles the flooding problem by anchoring to Tier 1 polls and flagging partisan outliers. When we cite a poll from a Tier 3 firm, we note it. When the race analysis section says "polling shows," it means nonpartisan polling, not an unfiltered average.

Aggregators and Forecasters We Reference

Not all polling averages are equal either. This document draws from:

Silver Bulletin — The most methodologically rigorous public polling average available. Weights by pollster quality, recency, and sample size. Direct successor to the Nate Silver-era FiveThirtyEight methodology [61].

Cook Political Report with Amy Walter — Nonpartisan race ratings (Solid/Likely/Lean/Toss-Up). Cook's ratings are this document's primary source for race classifications. Cook is slower to move races than some competitors, which makes their shifts more meaningful.

Sabato's Crystal Ball (UVA Center for Politics) — Independent race ratings and election analysis. Often aligns with Cook but sometimes diverges usefully. Particularly strong on Senate forecasting.

Inside Elections with Nathan Gonzales — Third major nonpartisan race rater. Useful as a tiebreaker when Cook and Sabato disagree.

Split Ticket — Newer aggregator with strong quality controls and transparent methodology. Particularly useful for House race analysis and for checking whether partisan polls are distorting other averages.

RealClearPolitics — Widely cited but uses a simple average with less quality weighting than other aggregators. This document uses RCP as a reference but not as a primary analytical source, because their averages are more susceptible to partisan flooding.

RacetotheWH — Election forecasting model run by Logan Phillips. Produces probabilistic forecasts for Senate, House, and governor races. This document cites its House win probability and district-level projections. Treat as a modeling tool (useful for scenario analysis) rather than a primary polling source.

Non-Polling Data Sources

Polling tells you where a race stands today. These sources tell you where it might be going:

Fundraising (FEC/OpenSecrets): Cash-on-hand and small-dollar donor counts as indicators of candidate strength and grassroots energy. Updated on the FEC filing calendar (see Part IV).

Special election results (Ballotpedia/DDHQ): Actual vote outcomes from off-cycle races as measures of the current political environment. Tracked in the Special Election Tracker above.

Generic ballot (Silver Bulletin/Morning Consult/DDHQ): National partisan preference as a leading indicator for House races and overall environment. Tracked in the Dashboard.

Approval ratings (Economist/YouGov, Pew, Gallup): Presidential approval as a structural predictor of midterm performance. Tracked in the Dashboard.

Early vote data (state election offices, Catalist): Registration and turnout data from primaries and early voting as real-time checks on enthusiasm models.

How to Read Polling in This Document

Five rules govern how we use polls throughout:

  1. Trend over snapshot. A single poll is a data point. Three polls showing the same direction are a trend. We report individual polls but base analysis on trajectories.

  2. Tier 1 anchors the analysis. When high-quality polls disagree with lower-tier polls, we weight toward quality. If a NYT/Siena poll shows D+7 and a Rasmussen poll shows R+1 in the same race, the analysis reflects the NYT/Siena result with a note about the outlier.

  3. Margin of error is real. Any race within 3-4 points is genuinely uncertain. We don't call a race "leaning" based on a single poll showing a 2-point lead.

  4. Midterm polling has been reliable. We don't apply a blanket "polls undercount Republicans" adjustment. That pattern has been specific to presidential cycles with Trump on the ballot. In midterms, the evidence says polls are close to right [66][67].

  5. Flag the source. Every polling number in this document includes the pollster name and date. If you see a number without attribution, something went wrong in the update.